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Professor Dr Dagmar Schiek, University of Leeds, contribution to Commentary on the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights for the European Union, edited by Steve Peers, Tamara Hervey, Jeff Kenner and An-
gela Ward [final accepted version – pre-publication] 
Article 23 Equality between women 
and men  
Equality between women and men must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and 
pay. 
The principle of equality shall not prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures providing for 
specific advantages in favour of the underrepresented sex.  
Text of Explanations to Article 23  
The first paragraph has been based on Articles 2 and 3(2) of the EC Treaty, now replaced by Article 3 
of the Treaty on European Union and Article 8 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Un-
ion which impose the objective of promoting equality between men and women on the Union, and 
on Article 157(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It draws on Article 20 of 
the revised European Social Charter of 3 May 1996 and on point 16 of the Community Charter on the 
rights of workers. 
It is also based on Article 157(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 
2(4) of Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for 
men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions. 
The second paragraph takes over in shorter form Article 157(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union which provides that the principle of equal treatment does not prevent the 
maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for 
the under-represented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disad-
vantages in professional careers. In accordance with Article 52(2), the present paragraph does not 
amend Article 157(4). 
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A. Field of Application of Article 23  
1 Article 23 has a potentially limitless field of application. Because the division of labour and other 
roles between women and men lies at the core of any human society, any policy or piece of legisla-
tion will impact upon it, or be impacted upon by it. The duty to ensure equality between women and 
men thus affects any activity the EU engages in as well as any implementing policies of its Member 
States.  
2 The EU Treaties and their predecessors have from 2000 contained explicit competences explicitly 
aimed at equality of women and men, partly preceded by competences contained in the Social Pol-
icy agreement attached to the Treaty of Maastricht. The oldest of these is Article 153 (1) letter (i) 
TFEU, which repeats the wording of Article 2 (1) Social Policy Agreement (1992)1 and allows the EU 
to complement and support the activities of its Member States in the field of “equality between men 
and women with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment at work”. Further, Article 157 
(3) TFEU provides for the adoption of “measures to ensure the application of the principle of equal 
                                                          
1 The Social Policy Agreement was concluded in 1992 by 11 out of the then 12 Member States, and annexed to 
the Treaty of Maastricht through a protocol. This enabled the Member States to bring forward EU social policy 
in parallel with the founding of Economic and Monetary Union, although the UK was strictly opposed to it. 
When the Treaty of Amsterdam was negotiated the UK government had changed, and the provisions of the 
Social Policy Agreement were integrated into the then Treaty on European Community. The protocol and the 
agreement are reprinted in 1992 OJ C 224/126-129. 
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opportunities and equal treatment of me and women in matters of employment and occupation, in-
cluding the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value.” This provision was first in-
troduced as Article 141 (3) with the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997/1999).2 Also, Article 19 TFEU, first 
introduced by the same Treaty as Article 13 EC, enables the EU to adopt legislation combating dis-
crimination based on sex beyond the field of employment. All these competences can be used to 
take measures that contribute to ensuring equality between women and men.  
3 However, the EU still lacks competences in some field decisive for equality between women and 
men. Before the Treaty of Lisbon, most core feminist legal policy fields3 such as politics on gendered 
violence within the family or legal restrictions of the relation of mothers and children were outside 
the competence sphere of the European Communities. The integration of what remained of the 
“Third Pillar” into the mainstream of the European Union polity partly changed this. As the EU now 
has a competence for cooperation in police and criminal matters, it is also able to ensure equality of 
women and men in this field if it acts. Similarly, coordination in civil justice may comprise some ele-
ments of family law, which mainly remains a national competence. However, some policies of core 
relevance for equality of women and men in European societies still lie beyond the EU’s core legisla-
tive competences, while laws and policies relating to economic integration and the newly reinforced 
social goals of the EU will also impact upon equality of women and men. Even beyond its legislative 
competences, the European Union engages in coordinating policies of its Member States, notably 
through the Open Method of Coordination. While the resulting documents and policy processes are 
not legally binding, they still have considerable impact on Member States’ policies. Accordingly, 
Charter provisions must also be complied with when engaging in such policy processes. Policies pur-
suing any other aim can and must be scrutinized in order to also promote equality between women 
and men under Article 23 CFREU.  
4 Further, the applicability of Charter depends on the categorisation of provisions as principles or 
rights. Principles can only be used to interpret EU legislation, but rights may be directly enforceable. 
(Article 52 (5) CFR EU). Regarding Article 23, the explanations helpfully state that it consists of rights 
and principles, without any reference to its individual articles.4 As will be shown below, both para-
graphs are judicially cognisable in some aspects, while the main relevance especially of Article 23 (1) 
lies in programming the interpretation and application of other Charter provisions and the provisions 
of the EU Treaties as well as programming politics.  
B. Relationship of Article 23 with other provisions of the Charter 
5 Laws and policy relevant to equality of women and men can be seen as embracing two dimensions 
– a negative dimension under which discrimination against women on grounds of sex should be pro-
hibited and a positive dimension under which measures are taken to ensure equality between the 
sexes.5 Within the Charter, the non-discrimination dimension is primarily addressed by Article 21, 
                                                          
2 The Treaty of Amsterdam was adopted in 1997, but its coming into force was delayed by referenda held in 
Denmark and Ireland before those Member States ratified the Treaty. It entered into force in May 1999.  
3 Feminist Legal Studies, ed. by Joanne Conaghan (London: Routledge, 2009), 1-IV. 
4 Explanations (*) Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, (2007) OJ 303/17, 32 
5 Political science literature classically distinguishes three dimensions: non-discrimination law, positive action 
and gender mainstreaming Theresa Rees, Mainstreaming Equality in the European Union: Education, Training 
and Labour Market Policies (London: Routledge, 1998)..  
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while Article 23 comprises one paragraph each on ensuring equality and allowing positive action. 
However, the fact that for equality between women and men there is a special provision must also 
impact on the interpretation and application of the general non-discrimination clause. Article 23 
thus constitutes a binding guideline for interpretation and application of Article 21 as far as equality 
of women and men is concerned.  
6 The term equality used in Article 23 might be reminiscent of Article 20, which also uses the term 
“equality” in its heading. However the text of that provision only uses the adjective equal, thus de-
manding equality as consistency6 in application of the law. In contrast to the obligation of adminis-
trators and courts to use the same standards for everyone in applying the law, the grand aim of 
equality of women and men aims at changing socio-economic reality to achieve de-facto equality of 
the sexes.  
7 The principle of ensuring equality between women and men also constitutes a horizontal principle, 
which has become known as the principle of “gender mainstreaming” (see below paragraph 31). As 
such, it relates to any provision of the Charter, and demands that it is interpreted in ways that en-
sure equality between women and men. Two examples may illustrate the consequences of this. 
8 Reading Charter provisions in line with women’s equality is particularly challenging where the pro-
tection of a specific right is prone to entrench traditional role expectations imposed on women, 
which often relate to women working more and / or for less recognition than men, or to expecting 
women to endure violence and other restrictions of their personal freedom. In international human 
rights law, tensions between protection of minorities and equality of women and men as well as fric-
tions between freedom of thought, conscience and religion and gender equality have long been 
acknowledged as a problem.7 Accordingly, there is a potential tension between Article 23 and Article 
22, if the latter is read as not only protecting diversity, but also cultural or religious groups.  
9 Further, there is a potential tension between Article 33 and Article 23. Only women can give birth, 
and this specific gift is made to impact on equality between women and men by social arrange-
ments. Frequently mothers are held responsible for children beyond the act of birthing, and in ex-
treme cases expected to deliver all the work connected to child-raising without being paid for it, to 
give up any employed work or any other ambition until their children can fend for themselves. Ma-
ternity can thus form a burden shackling women to a life of dependency from others, and limit their 
ability to be self-contained and to choose activities other than child minding and housework for their 
children and their father(s). Article 33 Charter, in protecting families unconditionally, does not refer 
to those and other damaging effects of women’s equality potentially flowing from the organisation 
of family life.  
                                                          
6 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) (pp. 8-14)., Dagmar 
Schiek, 'Torn between Arithmetic and substantive equality?', International Journal of Comparative Labour Law 
and Industrial Relations, 18 (2002a)), 149-68 (p. 150). 
7 See CCPR General Comment No 28, Article 3 (The Equality of Rights between Men and Women), adopted by 
the Committee at its 1834th meeting on 29 March 2000, no 32 and 21, on potential tensions between sex 
equality and religious freedom see Aileen McColgan, ''Class wars?: religion and (in)equality in the workplace’ ', 
Industrial Law Journal, 38 (2009), 1-29., on conflicts between minority protection and women’s rights see 
Susan Moller Okin, 'Mistress of Their Own Destiny. Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights to Exit', Ethics, 
112 (2002), 205-30.. 
8 
10 Article 33 paragraph 2 of the same provision affords “everyone” rights to maternity leave, pro-
tection against dismissal on grounds of maternity and to parental leave – although any maternity 
rights can only be enjoyed by women. Its focus on leave is also unnecessarily narrow: reconciliation 
of paid work and unpaid work in families8 could also be achieved by demanding that the organisa-
tion of paid work and publicly financed child care should leave sufficient time for mothers and fa-
thers to care for their children without reducing their paid work or any other career beyond child-
minding and housework. There is thus a potential tension between Article 33 and Article 23. This 
tension can be dissolved by interpreting Article 33 in line with Article 23 as to demand ways of pro-
tecting families and reconciliation that ensure equality between women and men at the same time. 
Other ways of protecting families and reconciliation would be unlawful as contradicting Article 23.  
C. Sources for Article 23 rights 
I. Council of Europe 
11 The ECHR does not contain a specific clause on any duty to ensure gender equality, which is thus 
only one element within the general equality clause of Article 14 ECHR, now transversally applicable 
under protocol number 12 to the ECHR. The ECHR’s lack of acknowledging any separate dimension 
of women’s equality is also mirrored in the ECtHR’s case law, which only started to address inequal-
ity between women and men as late as 1985, and still has to develop case law on issues such as posi-
tive action.9 The field of equality between women and men is clearly one where EU law traditionally 
has provided more extensive protection than the ECHR (Article 52 (3) CFR EU).  
12 However, other instruments of the Council of Europe embrace equality between women and men 
more fully. Article 20 of the Revised European Social Charter provides:  
With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to equal opportunities and equal 
treatment in matters of employment and occupation without discrimination on the grounds of 
sex, the Parties undertake to recognise that right and to take appropriate measures to ensure 
or promote its application in the following fields: 
   a) access to employment, protection against dismissal and occupational reintegration; 
   b) vocational guidance, training, retraining and rehabilitation 
   c) terms of employment and working conditions, including remuneration; 
   d) career development, including promotion. 
                                                          
8 On this principle see in more detail Eugenia Caracciolo di Torella and Annick Masselot, Reconciling Work and 
Family Life in EU Law and Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010). and commentary to Article 33 
9 On a comparison between ECtHR and ECJ case law on equality between women and men see Samantha 
Besson, 'Gender Discrimination under EU and ECHR Law: Never Shall the Twain Meet?', Human Rights Law 
Review, 8 (2008), 647-82. and Ivana Radačić, 'The European Court of Human Rights' Approach to Sex 
Discrimination', European Gender Equality Review, 2012, 13-22. 
9 
13 The Council has recently adopted a special convention on combating of violence against women, 
the Istanbul Convention, which will enter into force once 10 state parties have ratified it. Presently, 
only three state parties have ratified the convention.10  
II. United Nations 
1. General human rights instruments  
14 As many national constitutions in Europe, the UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) 
and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) each include a specific clause on equality be-
tween women and men in addition to its general prohibition of discrimination on a number of 
grounds. The identical Articles 3 require state parties “to ensure the equal right of men and women 
to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant.” These follow the 
equally identical Article 2 under which state parties “guarantee that the rights enunciated in the pre-
sent Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” The 
structure of the rights guaranteed in Article 21 and 23 CFREU mirrors this layout. In contrast to the 
CFR EU, these provisions limit their scopes to the rights protected in both the Covenants and have 
been considered as parasitic as a consequence.11 Only the CCPR contains an independent prohibition 
of discrimination, within which sex is named as one of the grounds on which discrimination is pro-
hibited.  
2. The International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) 
15 The UN main instrument in the field of equality of women and men goes much beyond a mere 
obligation to ensure equality and provide for special measures in favour of women. This convention 
was the first to establish an explicitly asymmetric approach to equality rights. Its Article 1 defines 
discrimination against women as  
Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or pur-
pose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective 
of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. 
16 Article 4 specifies that neither “temporary special measures aimed at accelerating the de-facto 
equality between men and women” nor “special measures aimed at protecting maternity” shall be 
considered as discrimination in the sense of the Convention. As regards measures aimed at acceler-
ating de facto equality, the Convention specifies that these must be discontinued when (not if) the 
objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved.  
17 These provisions are frequently seen as going beyond the limited space the Court of Justice of the 
European Union has allowed for positive action in EU law, which of course raises the question in how 
                                                          
10 CETS 210. The convention was adopted on 11 April 2011, and opened for signature on 11 May in Istanbul, 
current status is listed here: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/convention-violence/conven-
tion_en.asp  
11 Wouter Vandenhole, Non-Discrimination and Equality in the View of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies 
(Antwerp: Intersentia, 2005) (p. 13).. 
10 
far the more restrictive approach of EU law towards “positive action” may be in conflict with the 
CEDAW, and what consequences this may have (below paragraph 49). 
III. European Union 
18 Gender equality is frequently considered as one of the best developed aspects of EU law,12 rang-
ing from the most developed field of social policy to an important human rights policy subject13 and 
the embodiment of developing innovative ways to regulate, such as the principle of gender main-
streaming.14 Accordingly, there are numerous emanations and assertions of this principle in Euro-
pean Union law and policy, including so called soft law instruments, which are not legally binding, 
but must be drawn upon when interpreting EU law. As concerns the latter category, the Community 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of Workers proclaimed 
16. Equal treatment for men and women must be assured. Equal opportunities for men and 
women must be developed.  
To this end, action should be intensified wherever necessary to ensure the implementation of 
the principle of equality between men and women as regards in particular access to employ-
ment, remuneration, working conditions, social protection, education, vocational training and 
career development.  
Measures should also be developed enabling men and women to reconcile their occupational 
and family obligations. 
This instrument was solemnly declared by the then EU Member States in 1989, with the UK’s absten-
tion.15  
19 Long before the Community Charter and the CFREU were adopted, equal treatment of men and 
women had been acknowledged as one of the general principles of Union law. The Court issued the 
pivotal Defrenne II ruling in 1976,16 just after the Council had agreed that “achieving equality be-
tween men and women” in the world of work should be one of the priorities of its social action pro-
gramme.17 Community legislation relating to this aim focused on equal treatment between women 
and men, i.e. non-discrimination rather than equality, but stressed that its purpose was to “put into 
                                                          
12 On the history of EU gender equality law see Tamara Hervey, 'Thirty Years of EU Sex Equality Law: Looking 
Backwards, Looking Forwards', Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 12 (2005), 307-25. and 
the contributions to the special issue she is introducing in this article, see also Sevil Sümer, European Gender 
Regimes and Policies (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009) (pp. 59 - 85).. 
13 The elegy in the relevant chapter of one of the predecessors of this volume is characteristic in maintaining 
that “gender equality is the most robust and highly developed aspect of European Union social policy. While 
other areas of social policy are characterised by shared competences and flexibility of instruments, gender 
equality has been described as ‘federalism encapsulated’ [ ] long based on an ethic of enforceable individual 
rights invocable against Member States and private individuals.[ ]” Catheryne Costello, 'Gender Equality in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union', in Economic and Social Rights Under the Eu Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: A Legal Perspective, ed. by Tamara Hervey and Jeffrey Kenner (Oxford: Hart, 2003), pp. 
111-37 (pp. 111-112, references omitted).. 
14 Fiona Beveridge and Samantha Velluti, Gender and the Open Method of Coordination. Perspectives on Law, 
Governance and Equality in the EU (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008).. 
15 Social Europe 1/90, p. 45 
16 Case 43/75 Defrenne II [1976] ECR 455 
17 (1974) OJ C 13/1 
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effect the principle of equal treatment” (Article 1 (1) Directive 1976/207).18 Even after legislation in 
the social policy field came to a halt, legislation regarding sex equality continued to flourish. Today, 
the purpose of such legislation is sometimes a dual one. Thus, Directive 2006/5419 aims to “ensure 
the implementation of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of 
employment and occupation” (Article 1 (1)).  
20 This development reflects the incremental progress of primary EU law towards recognising equal-
ity between men and women as an aim to be pursued, rather than mere equal treatment. The 
Treaty of Amsterdam introduced equality between men and women as an aim of the Community 
(Article 2 EC), and this aim is maintained in Article 3 (3) TEU. The Treaty of Amsterdam20 also intro-
duced the Community’s obligation to “aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality be-
tween men and women” in all its activities (Article 3 (2) EC, now Article 8 TFEU). The same Treaty in-
troduced into Article 141 (4) EC the “view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and 
women” (now Article 157 (4) TFEU). This clause did not prevent the EU legislator from maintaining a 
focus on equal treatment. For example, the youngest sex equality Directive, though based on Article 
157 (3), does not reaffirm the obligation to ensure full equality between men and women, but is re-
stricted to mere equal treatment (Directive 2010/41).21  
21 Accordingly, Article 23 CFREU is underpinned by primary and secondary EU law, both as a right 
and as a principle. It reinforces the heightened position of gender equality in EU law by also giving 
this constitutional principle22 an elevated position within the Charter. The Charter does not offer any 
comparably all-encompassing provisions relating to other inequality. Given the elevated relevance of 
gender equality in EU law, a commentary on Article 23 CFREU will always attract criticism for not 
covering everything which was ever discussed in this field. The following sections maintain the focus 
on what should be the function of a commentary: on exegesis of the positive law in context with its 
purposes, adding some examples of practical applications.   
D. Analysis 
I. General Remarks 
Article 23 contains two profoundly different paragraphs: paragraph 1 subjects the EU and its Mem-
ber States when implementing EU law to the positive obligation of ensuring equality between 
women and men in all areas, while paragraph 2 contains a clarification relating to positive action, 
                                                          
18 Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions 
 (1976) OJ L 39/40, now superseded by Directive 2006/54/EC  
19 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the implementation of the principle 
of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (re-
cast) (2006) OJ 204/23.  
20 (1997) OJ C 340/1 
21 Directive 2010/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on the application of the principle of 
equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in a self-employed capacity and repealing 
Council Directive 86/613/EEC, (2010) OJ 180/1 
22 Sophia Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos, 'The Amended Equal Treatment Directive (2002/73): an Expression of 
Constitutional Principles/ Fundamental Rights', Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 12 
(2005), 327-68 (pp. 331-36). 
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seemingly phrasing specific advantages in favour of women as an exception to the principle of equal-
ity. Accordingly, the structure maintained in commenting other articles is of limited use to this provi-
sion, which requires a specific commentary for each of its paragraphs. 
II. Paragraph 1 
“Equality between women and men must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and 
pay.” 
1. Women’s’ rights or equality between women and men?  
22 Academic and political debate on women’s rights is rife with conceptual schism on the question 
whether women’s rights should be related to men’s rights, or to any notion of equality between 
women and men.23 Women’s law, as for example introduced by Tove Stang Dahl,24 does not neces-
sarily relate to women and men. Instead it pursues the “objective to improve the position of women 
in law and society”, 25 an objective that has also been characterised as lying at the base of feminist 
legal studies.26 From this perspective, women’s rights would aim at enhancing women’s capability of 
governing their own lives in interrelation with others.27 Any reference to men is not necessarily help-
ful for achieving that aim, but may rather betray women’s rights, because it implies for women to 
assimilate to a male norm. For example, if rights must always be granted to women and men in 
equal measure, women could not derive rights from birthing or nursing children, as this is something 
men cannot do. Granting rights only for “those women who are able to act in the same way as men” 
is thus a severe critique of EU gender policies.28 Women’s law seems to offer an alternative to this by 
focusing on women instead of men. Article 23 CFREU does not embrace this notion, though. 
23 Both women’s law and the legal strive for equality between women and men can further be criti-
cised as being implicitly assimilationist for the mere reason that it focuses on women as a seemingly 
essentialist category, while there are as many differences between women as between women and 
men. Especially the Nordic model of women’s law has been so criticised: while its policy towards 
equalising the sexes may imply a movement towards each other rather than a movement of women 
towards men, it still maintains the perspective that differences between women and men are the 
                                                          
23 As indicated in Aileen McColgan, Women under the Law: the False Promise of Human Rights (Essex: 
Longman, 1999). 
24 Tove Stang Dahl, Introduction to Women's Law (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1987). 
25 Anne Hellum, 'CEDAW and the discipline of women's law: Continuity and change in the understanding of 
gender and law', in Scandinavian Women's Law in the 21st Century, ed. by Ruth Nielsen and Christina Tvarnø 
(Copenhagen: DJØF, 2012), pp. 31-61 (p. 32). 
26 Eva-Maria Svensson, 'Is there a Future for Scandinavian Women's Law?', in Scandinavian Women's Law in 
the 21st Century, ed. by Ruth Nielsen and Christina Tvarnø (Copenhagen: DØJF, 2012), pp. 15-29 (p. 25). Argua-
bly, this is an outsider view. Insider feminists are prone to much more complex views. For a statement of Law, 
Gender and Sexualities  
27 A similar starting point is taken by Susan Moller Okin, 'Mistress of Their Own Destiny. Group Rights, Gender, 
and Realistic Rights to Exit', Ethics, 112 (2002), 205-30.  
28 Sylvia Walby, 'The European Union and Gender Equality: Emergent Varieties of Gender Regimes', Social 
Politics, 11 (2004), 4-29 (p. 5). Walby uses the rest of the article to de-construct this criticism and to defend the 
view that the EU has indeed achieved much more than a merely assimilationist gender equality regime.  
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main ones to be overcome,29 potentially resulting in neglecting differences between. 30  Although Ar-
ticle 23 maintains the perspective of equality between women and men, its positioning behind the 
general non-discrimination clause of Article 22 CFREU implies that it should also be read in a coher-
ent way with this provision. Accordingly, while striving for equality between women and men, the 
diversity within these categories must be acknowledged when interpreting and applying Article 23 
CFREU. 
2. Women and men - notions 
24 Further, it could be questioned why Article 23 CFREU uses the very categories “women” and 
“men”. Sexualities theory and feminism have long questioned whether this binary model of gen-
dered reality adequately mirrors the reality of humankind, or whether it is not altogether a social 
construct. Nature does not always conform to the desire of categorising people as either woman or 
man. Whatever the alleged biological base of this categorisation - chromosomes, outer genitals, sec-
ondary sex identifiers – children are born in more than two varieties. In a society which insists on 
two sexes only, this creates problems for those falling between the categories. Children who do not 
dispel the expected sex categories at birth are frequently still altered by risky surgery. People who 
perceive themselves as belonging to a different gender than their bodies suggest often too feel com-
pelled to seek surgery with all its risks.31 Categorizing people into women and men is thus not a bio-
logical fact but rather a social convention, which is closely linked to women and men performing dif-
ferent roles in society, including the so called private sphere. There are of course some biological dif-
ferences between women and men, mainly relating to the ability to give birth. Predominantly, hu-
mans are brought up as women and men and consequently most embrace one of these identities 
and identify with the corresponding values, roles and life styles. Mentioning only women and men, 
Article 23 CFREU latches onto those social conventions based on biological difference. Accordingly, it 
is important to read the notions of women and men in Article 23 as social constructs rather than es-
sential categories.  
25 In academic writing as well as in EU policy documents, the notion “gender” is frequently used in 
addition to sex in order to underline the social construction of women and men. The notion gender 
expresses that organising society around the assumed two biological sexes and their different roles 
is not a fact of nature, but a social convention.32 As social convention, gender is built around social 
expectations of maintaining a certain organisation of society, which is at the same time closely 
aligned with an unequal division of labour and resources between those categorised as male and fe-
                                                          
29 This is also implied by the slogan “women are the majority, not a group”, which was used during the negotia-
tions for the Constitutional Treaty in order to support the enhanced notion of gender equality among all the 
different equalities.   
30 Anne Hellum, 'CEDAW and the discipline of women's law: Continuity and change in the understanding of 
gender and law', in Scandinavian Women's Law in the 21st Century, ed. by Ruth Nielsen and Christina Tvarnø 
(Copenhagen: DJØF, 2012), pp. 31-61. 
31 There is a growing body of literature on transsexual and transgender people. For an overview considering 
these problems as part of the gender node see Silvan Agius and Christa Tobler, Trans und intersex people. 
Discrimination on grounds of sex, gender identity and gender expression (Brussels: European Commission, 
2011). with numerous academic references. 
32 See for example Sevil Sümer, European Gender Regimes and Policies (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009) (pp. 5-6, with 
further references). 
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male, and a certain structure of families as the basis for division of labour and organisation of sexual-
ity. Gender thus can be read as a node33 including notions traditionally referred to as homosexuality 
and heterosexuality, for example, and comprising trans- and intersex persons, who do not fit neatly 
the categories of male and female. Article 23 CFREU is nevertheless focused on women and men, 
and does not include those notions explicitly. Any wider notion can only be derived from expanding 
our interpretation of the provision towards equality. 
3. Equality between women and men  
26 The aim to be pursued under Article 23 is equality between women and men, a notion that goes 
beyond only prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sex (Article 21 CFR EU). Considering that 
women and men are also diversified by a number of other ascribed characteristics, including alleged 
race, ethnic origin, bodily capacity and being disabled by societies expectations, inequalities be-
tween women and men are also widely varied.  
27 With all these varieties inequalities between women and men can still be captured in general 
terms. It results from social processes resulting in durable inequalities34 between those categorised 
as female and male respectively (women and men). These inequalities privilege men over women. 
Women are usually made to work more, earn less for the same amount of work and have more lim-
ited access to resources generally.35 This is achieved by structuring the division of labour between 
women and men along the lines preordained by expectations of heterosexuality as the norm (het-
ero-normativity).36 While the detail of inequalities between women and men differ between differ-
ent societies, the burdening of women with more work, in particular more unpaid or low paid work, 
than men is common to societies in all EU Member States. To a large extent, this is achieved by 
women delivering more unpaid work in families, caring for children, the elderly and servicing men in 
their reproductive needs.37 Inequalities between women and men also include sexualisation and 
emotionalisation of women, and the expectation that women endure physical violence, including 
sexual violence, and other restrictions of their physical integrity and personal liberty.38  
                                                          
33 Dagmar Schiek, 'Organising EU Equality Law Around the Nodes of 'Race', Gender and Disability', in EU Non-
Discrimination Law and Intersectionality: investigating the triangle of racial, gender and disability 
discrimination, ed. by Dagmar Schiek and Anna Lawson (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 11-27 (p. 24). 
34 On the construction of durable inequalities through social interactions see Iris Marion Young, 'Structural 
Injustice and the Politics of Difference', in Intersectionality and Beyond (Oxon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009), pp. 
273-98 (p. 275). 
35 For the European Union, these indicators are reported in an annual report by the European Commission. The 
latest of these is available for 2011 (European Commission, Progress on equality between women and men in 
2011, Brussels 2012, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/document/index_en.htm#h2-2 . 
More recent data is available on the gender pay gap, i.e. the difference in remuneration for comparable work 
by sex, which is measured annually (European Commission, The Gender Pay Gap 2013, Brussels 2013, available 
from http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/gender_pay_gap/gpg_brochure_2013_final_en.pdf  
36  
37 The time use per gender is one of the worst documented indicators for gender (in)equality. Even for the Eu-
ropean Union, this indicator is only available for a limited amount of countries, and for some years. The young-
est data is of 2006 and shows that women work between 50 and 200 % more than men on domestic tasks 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-NK-06-004/EN/KS-NK-06-004-EN.PDF) 
38 Again, statistical capture of violence against women is incomplete. The EU Commission nevertheless pro-
vides an overview of the problem on a regular base, lastly for  
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28 The EU and its predecessors have developed their approach to inequalities between women and 
men since 1957. From the beginning, equal pay of men and women was to be maintained by Mem-
ber States. It is no secret that this obligation was initially driven by economic motives, and also by 
the need to align French ideas of harmonising social rights alongside economic integration with the 
German insistence that economic integration can and should go forward without social integration.39  
However, the EU has incrementally developed from viewing equality between women and men as a 
mere annex to economic integration towards appreciating the human rights dimension of the field. 
While the Court of Justice initially stated that economic and social motives have equal weight in the 
field,40 it stated in 2000 that the human rights dimension prevailed as the most central on in the 
field.41 The EU legislator has initially focused on the employment and occupation, including social se-
curity.42 With expanding competences (above paragraph 2) it has also expanded gender equality leg-
islation to new fields, such as access to goods and services.43 Further, gender equality is an element 
of the OMC where the EU cannot wield legislative competences. 44  
29 With all these developments, some doubt whether the Charter adds anything specifically.45 It is 
submitted that Article 23 CFREU does constitute change. With its recognition as legally binding, 
equality between women and men has achieved the status of a human right. Further, the clause 
goes beyond the EU acquis developed in this fields in one other important aspect, namely in the or-
der of words. While the Treaties and secondary legislation always relate to men and women (equal 
treatment of men and women, equal pay), the Charter reverses the order and speaks about equality 
of women and men. While the egalitarian principle is maintained, the change in order also consti-
tutes a further milestone. Naming women first, the Charter acknowledges the asymmetric character 
of sex inequality to the detriment of women. Asymmetry of equality rights46 is frequently used to 
support a reading that does not outlaw discrimination of the privileged group (or sex) in order to 
achieve equality in socio-economic reality. Such measures can be necessary to overcome the para-
dox of equality law: modern laws concerning equality and discrimination are not restricted to merely 
formal equality. They are more ambitious in pursuing the aim of changing socio-economic reality in 
                                                          
39 Gillian More, 'The Principle of Equal Treatment: From Market Unifier to Fundamental Right?', in The 
Evolution of EU Law, ed. by Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, 1st edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
pp. 517-53.  
40 ECJ 43/75 Defrenne II [1976] ECR 445, paras 9-10 
41 ECJ C-50/96 Schröder [2000] ECR I-743, para. 57 
42 Today, the most important directives in these fields are Directives 2006/54 on equal treatment of women 
and men in employment and occupation and Directive 79/80 on equal treatment of women and men in social 
security.  
43 Directive 2004/113/EC 
44 Fiona Beveridge and Samantha Velluti, Gender and the Open Method of Coordination. Perspectives on Law, 
Governance and Equality in the EU (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008). 
45 Catheryne Costello, 'Gender Equality in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union', in 
Economic and Social Rights Under the Eu Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Legal Perspective, ed. by Tamara 
Hervey and Jeffrey Kenner (Oxford: Hart, 2003), pp. 111-37 (p. 112). Evelyn Ellis, 'The Impact of the Lisbon 
Treaty on Gender Equality', European Gender Equality Law Review, 2010, 7-13 (p. 11). 
46 On this see already Dagmar Schiek, 'Elements of a New Framework for the Principle of Equal Treatment of 
Persons in EC Law: Directrives 2000/43/EC, 2000/78/EC and 2002/73/EC changing Directive 76/207/EEC in 
context', European Law Journal, 8 (2002), 137-57. 
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favour of those who have been at the receiving end of discrimination.47 To achieve such change, for-
mally neutral rules are not always sufficient. At times it is also necessary to grant privileges to those 
who have hitherto suffered detriment. Sometimes, taking away a privileged position will also be per-
ceived as detriment, but at times even further positive action will be required. While Article 23 (2) 
provides a more specific rule on positive action, the wording of Article 23 (1) changes the conceptual 
base for such positive action by acknowledging that women are those suffering from detriment 
through its revised order of words. It thus suggests that positive duties and positive action are firmly 
based on a notion of asymmetry.   
4. Ensuring equality in all areas, including employment, work and pay  
30 In requiring the EU and its Member States to ensure equality, Article 23 (1) goes beyond an obli-
gation to refrain from discrimination (Article 21) as well as a duty to respect diversity (Article 22). In 
the English discourse, the term “positive duties” is used for an obligation to ensure equality. These 
have recently been codified in the recent Equality Act,48 after having given rise to a new philosophy 
of human rights based on doctrines of equality law.49 In Continental Member States, the concept of 
positive state obligations to create preconditions for enjoyment of human rights is frequently de-
rived from social state principles.50 In addition, some Continental constitutions explicitly demand 
that equality between women and men must be ensured51.  
31 In international law this corresponds to the obligation to promote human rights. Relating to 
equality of women and men, the obligation to promote the factual conditions for the enjoyment of 
rights has first been linked to gender mainstreaming after the 1985 UN women summit52 and was 
fully developed as an instrument during the 1995 UN summit on women.53 The EU Commission had 
                                                          
47 Dagmar Schiek, 'Torn between Arithmetic and substantive equality?', International Journal of Comparative 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 18 (2002a)), 149-68. 
48 On this see Bob Hepple, Equality - The New Framework (Oxford & Portland (Oregon): Hart, 2011) (pp. 134-
40). 
49 Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
50 See for an English language overview Stylianos-Ioannis Koutnatzis, 'Social rights as constitutional 
compromise: lessons from comparative experience', Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 44 (2005), 74-
133., for the German constitution see D Schiek, 'Artikel 20 Abs. 1-3 V: Sozialstaat', in Alternativkommentar zum 
Grundgesetz (Neuwied et al: Luchterhand, 2001), II. 
51 For example, under section 6 of the Finnish Constitution “Equality between the sexes is promoted in societal 
activity and working life”; under Article 1 of the French constitution “statutes shall promote equal access by 
women and men to elective offices and posts as well as to positions of professional and social responsibility”, 
under Article 3 (2) of the German constitution “the state shall promote the actual implementation of equal 
rights for women and men and take steps to eliminate disadvantages that now exist”, und er Article 114 of the 
Greek constitution the “state shall take measures for the elimination of inequalities actually existing, in partic-
ular to the detriment of women”; the Italian constitution stresses the obligation of the Republic and its regions 
to promote equal opportunity between women and men, and to remove hindrances to full equality of men 
and women in social, cultural and economic life, while also stressing women’s “essential role in the family” (Ar-
ticles 37, 48, 51,117). These quotes are taken from Jane Huckerby, 'Gender Equality and Constitutions of 
Europe and North America', in Gender Equality and Constitutions. Comparative Provisions, ed. by 
UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (Geneva: United Nations, 2012), pp. 1-68..  
52 Sevil Sümer, European Gender Regimes and Policies (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009) (p. 79). 
53 UN Fourth World Conference on Women (1995) Global Platform for Action – Beijing, New York United Na-
tion Publishing Jill Rubery, 'Gender Mainstreaming and the OMC. Is the Open Method of Coordination too 
open for Ge der Equality Policy?', in The Open Method of Coordination in Action. The European Employment 
and Social Inclusion Strategies, ed. by Jonathan Zeitlin and Paul Pochet (Brussels: PIE: Peter Lang, 2005). 
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actively contributed to the 1995 summit with a proposal, based on the appraisal of the gender main-
streaming strategy in its 3rd Action Programme for Equal Opportunities.54 Immediately after the Bei-
jing Platform had been adopted, EU Commission55 and Council of Europe56 documents established 
definitions of gender mainstreaming that are still quoted as decisive. According to these, gender 
mainstreaming constitutes a change in strategy in that women’s equality is no longer pursued by 
specific instruments only, but rather through the incorporation of a gender equality perspective into 
developing, evaluating and improving any policy process.57 The inclusion of the gender mainstream-
ing principle into primary EU law was achieved with the Treaty of Amsterdam, which established the 
wording of today’s Article 8 TFEU (see above paragraph 20).  
32 However, Article 23 (1) CFREU once again goes beyond the established acquis. While under Arti-
cle 8 TFEU the Union shall only aim to eliminate inequalities and to promote equality between men 
and women, Article 23 (1) CFREU demands that equality must be ensured. Thus, it is not sufficient to 
integrate a mere gender perspective and to strive for more equality. Instead, the obligation under 
Article 23 (1) is only fulfilled once a change in society has been achieved and secured which may well 
seem utopian today, given the gross inequality between women and men, which increases when-
ever there is some crisis leading to scarcity of resources.58 This enhanced obligation might even quell 
some of the criticism of gender mainstreaming EU style, according to which gender mainstreaming is 
only successful for policies driven by such departments that are conscious of the needs of gender 
equality anyway59 or is based on a reductionist approach attributing gender inequality to some eco-
nomic habits mainly.60 There is no doubt that a process-focused approach to overcoming inequalities 
between women and men is necessary, as a corollary to non-discrimination policies, if socio-eco-
nomic reality should be changed.61 If EU institutions are not only required to pay some attention to 
structures by attempting to overcome inequality, but are rather required to ensure equality, this 
structural perspective may actually yield success.  
                                                          
54 COM 90 (449) final 
55 Communication from the Commission to the Council: Incorporating Equal Opportunities for Women and 
Men into All Community Policies and Activities COM (1996) 67 
56 Council of Europe: Gender Mainstreaming. Conceptual Framework, Methodology and Presentation of Good 
Practices. Strasbourg (available from http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/equality/03themes/gender-
mainstreaming/EG_S_MS_98_2_rev_en.pdf - 3 March 2013) 
57 See for summaries and quotes from those instruments Fiona Beveridge and Samantha Velluti, Gender and 
the Open Method of Coordination. Perspectives on Law, Governance and Equality in the EU (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2008) (p. 17).; Ruth Nielsen, 'Is European Union equality law capable of adressing multiple and 
intersectional discrimination yet?', in European Union Non-Discrimination Law - Comparative Perspectives on 
Multidimensional Equality Law (London & New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009), pp. 29-52 (pp. 39-40). 
58 See Francesca Bettio and others, The Impact of the Economic Crisis on the Situation of Women and Men and 
on Gender Equaltiy Policies, ed. by European Network of Experts on Gender Equality (Brussels: EU Commission, 
2012). 
59 Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) (pp. 192-4). 
60 C Booth and C Bennet, 'Gender Mainstreaming in the EU: TOrwards a New Conception and Practice of Equal 
Opportunity?', European Journal of Women's Studies, 9 (2002), 430-46 (p. 441).; Kevät Nousiainen, 'Utility-
based equality an disparate diversities: from a Finnish Perspective', in European Union Non-Discrimination 
Law: Comparative Perspectives on Multidimensional Equality Law, ed. by Dagmar Schiek and Victoria Chege 
(New York: Routledgeq, 2009), pp. 187-214 (pp. 190-92). 
61 Accordingly, there are also optimistic assessments of the EU gender mainstreaming strategy. Silvia Walby, 
'Gender Mainstreaming. Productive Tensions in Theory and Practice', Social Politics, 12 (2005), 321-43. 
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33 The more assertive formulation of Article 23 (1) CFREU if compared with Article 8 TFEU requires 
more than considering gender equality in policy formulation. If inequalities between women and 
men persist, ensuring equality may require taking specific measures in favour of overcoming detri-
ments that women face. The positive obligation to ensure equality of women and men aims at socio-
economic reality, frequently also referred to as substantive equality or transformative equality.62 
Overcoming inequalities between women and men “in all areas” requires that the EU and its Mem-
ber States strive for such equality rather than only supporting formal approaches to equal treat-
ment. Article 23 (1) demands mainstreaming he obligation to ensure equality applies to all areas, 
while employment, work and pay are the ones stressed explicitly. The latter is in line with the origins 
of the EU’s gender equality policies (above paragraph 28), but the Charter also clarifies that this is 
today only one fraction of the areas in which equality of women and men must be ensured. This obli-
gation rests on all institutions, the judiciary in interpreting non-discrimination and other law as well 
as the legislator in adopting new legislation and the EU Commission in developing policies. 
34 As far as the legislation and policy development are concerned, Article 52 CFREU may lead to 
doubts whether the prospective duty to take measures in the future, is open to judicial review (or 
“justiciable” in the words of the Comments to the Charter). However, if the EU has taken legislative 
measures, these must at the same time ensure equality between women and men. Thus, to name 
but one example, the neglect to provide for considering the specific situation of women in the Di-
rective on unwelcome migrants is not only worthy of academic critique,63 but also constitutes a vio-
lation of Article 23. Further, the EU Commission and the Council are also bound by Article 23 when 
engaging in policy coordination without binding legal effects. With the legally binding effect of the 
Charter, the question how gender mainstreaming has been applied in the Open Method of Coordina-
tion64 has become a constitutional one. 
35 Article 23 (1) also binds the judiciary, including the Court of Justice, and the national courts in 
Member States when applying EU law. Their responsibility to ensure equality between women and 
men in all areas impacts upon the interpretation of all EU law. This includes interpreting non-dis-
crimination clauses in the Charter itself as well as in other EU law, including Articles 18, 157 TFEU 
and secondary law based on Articles 19 and 157 (3) TFEU. The obligation to ensure equality can only 
be achieved if substantive and possibly transformative equality is safeguarded when applying EU sex 
discrimination law.65 Within sex discrimination law, the prohibition of indirect discrimination has 
been discussed as one which is closely linked to substantive equality.66 The concept of indirect dis-
crimination, in short, states that discrimination may exist even if a rule or practice does not explicitly 
refer to, for example, sex, but results in practice in excluding women (or men) disproportionally from 
advantages. Prohibiting indirect discrimination may serve to prevent circumvention of a prohibition 
of direct discrimination, which is unrelated to substantive equality. However, targeting the practical 
                                                          
62 The different notions of equality are considered in the commentaries on Articles 20 (Bell) and 21 (Kilpatrick).  
63 Heli Askola, ''Illegal Migrants', Gender and Vulnerability: The Case of the EU Returns Directives ', Feminist 
Legal Studies, 18 (2010), 159-78. 
64 Fiona Beveridge and Samantha Velluti, Gender and the Open Method of Coordination. Perspectives on Law, 
Governance and Equality in the EU (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008). 
65 On this notion see already Ruth Nielsen, 'Is European Union equality law capable of adressing multiple and 
intersectional discrimination yet?', in European Union Non-Discrimination Law - Comparative Perspectives on 
Multidimensional Equality Law (London & New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009), pp. 29-52 (pp. 40-42). 
66 Evelyn Ellis and Philippa Watson, EU Anti-Discrimination Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012) (pp. 142-43)..  
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effects of a rule, beyond its motives and even its wording, is also related to socio-economic reality, 
and thus based on a social engineering perspective.67 Based on the assumption that inequality be-
tween women and men is entrenched in social reality, any rule reinforcing this inequality is prima 
facie suspect, and discrimination is assumed. After the harmonisation of EU sex equality law with 
non-discrimination law on other grounds, indirect sex discrimination is now deemed to exist “where 
an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of one sex at a particular 
disadvantage compared with persons of the other sex, unless that criterion or practice is objectively 
justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary”.68 
This definition does not necessarily require statistical evidence, which makes proving indirect dis-
crimination easier. On the other hand, it also seemed to introduce an element of comparison into 
the definition, which threatened to undermine the efficiency of the concept for achieving substan-
tive equality. For example, the Court had held that women on on-call employment contracts were 
not comparable with employees on more secure contracts,69 and stated that women and men on 
parental leave were not comparable with men absent from work for their military service.70 This 
meant that the lower levels of protection against dismissal of workers on parental leave and against 
overly long working times of workers on on-call contracts could not be challenged under the prohibi-
tion of indirect discrimination, although these detriments affected women disproportionally. This 
again means that the prohibition of indirect discrimination is deprived of its effectiveness especially 
in cases where its application would contribute to challenging gender stereotypes, such as that that 
military service is in the public interest while caring for children within the family is merely in one’s 
private interest, or that workers on flexible part time employment contracts are probably secured 
elsewhere (through their family relations) and thus les worthy of protection.71 The wording of the 
provisions defining indirect discrimination is sufficiently ambiguous as to allow a more comprehen-
sive reading, which would also allow accommodating substantive equality. Such a reading would 
now be demanded by Article 23 (1) CFREU. , and can be read as not establishing the so-called com-
parator approach.72 Other elements of sex discrimination law are also considered as being based on 
substantive equality. These include the equation of sexual harassment with discrimination, and the 
provision allowing limited positive action measures.73 
36 A further field in which the requirement to ensure equality between women and men can lead to 
purposive interpretation of EU non-discrimination law is the field of intersectional disadvantage. So 
                                                          
67 These deliberations have been developed in more breadth in Dagmar Schiek, 'Indirect Discrimination', in 
Cases, Materials and Text on International, Supranational and National Non-Discrimination Law (Oxford & 
Portland (Oregon): Hart, 2007), pp. 323-476 (pp. 327-31). 
68 Directive 2006/54/EC Article 2 1. (b) for employment related discrimination, Article 2 (b) Directive 
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69 ECJ C-313/02 Wippel v Peek & Cloppenburg [2004] ECR I-9483 
70 eCJ C-220/02 Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund (ÖGB), Gewerkschaft der Privatangestellten v. 
Wirtschaftskammer Österreich [2004] ECR I-5907 
71 See for a critique of these rulings, with further references, Dagmar Schiek, 'Indirect Discrimination', in Cases, 
Materials and Text on International, Supranational and National Non-Discrimination Law (Oxford & Portland 
(Oregon): Hart, 2007), pp. 323-476 (pp. 468-71)., with a similar turn see also Ann Numhauser-Henning, 'EU sex 
equality law post Amsterdam', in Equality Law in an Enlarged European Union, ed. by Helen Meenan 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 145-76 (pp. 169-70). 
72 On this see Kilpatrick/Bell above ### 
73 Teresa Freixes, 'Article 23. Egalité entre hommes et femmes', in Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, ed. by EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental R (Brussels: 
European Commission, 2006), pp. 200-08 (p. 201. 203). 
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far, EU non-discrimination legislation protects against discrimination on the basis of six grounds (sex, 
ethnic and racial origin, religion and believe, age, disability, sexual orientation); Article 21 CFREU 
adds colour, social origin, genetic features, language, political or any other opinion, membership of a 
national minority, property and birth as well as any other ground. Accordingly, discrimination on 
more than one ground is increasingly likely to be covered by EU non-discrimination law. Such dis-
crimination is increasingly debated in socio-legal theory as intersectional disadvantage,74 while the 
EU institutions and EU secondary legislation prefer the term “multiple discrimination”.75 The term 
intersectionality was first introduced by Crenshaw76 in order to characterise the specific disad-
vantage suffered by women of colour which could not be explained by a mere addition of sex and 
race discrimination and overall tended to be overlooked by the law. The term has hence been used 
to characterise exactly this: the specific disadvantage suffered by those discrimination on more than 
one ground. In recent years, there has been a legal policy debate in the European Union on whether 
specific legislation is needed in order for EU law to address intersectional discrimination of women.77 
On the other hand, there is scope for a teleological interpretation of the body of EU anti-discrimina-
tion legislation to the effect that these directives already entail a prohibition of intersectional dis-
crimination.78 Clearly the latter interpretation would be in line with the Court’s tradition of purpos-
ive interpretation. It would also seem to be demanded by the need to promote equality between 
women and men. This derives from the deliberation that discrimination works in asymmetrical ways 
generally, and that sex discrimination works asymmetrically to the detriment of women. Thus, while 
each human being simultaneously has a gender, an ethnicity, an age, a sexual orientation and a reli-
gious belief (which may be atheism), not everyone suffers from discrimination in all these dimen-
sions in equal measure. Women will suffer more from sex discrimination than men, those deemed to 
belong to an ethnic minority suffer more from discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin, those with 
darker skin colours suffer more from racial discrimination than those of lighter skin colour, and those 
loving the opposite sex suffer from less discrimination than those whose partner is of the same sex. 
Considering intersectional discrimination, this asymmetry leads to women suffering more frequently 
from this phenomenon than men. While a white man considered disabled but not considered as be-
longing to a minority religion or as being gay will only suffer from disability discrimination, a white 
woman in the same situation will suffer from discrimination at the intersection between disability 
and gender. This applies to the comparison between a black man not deemed disabled, gay or of mi-
nority religion and a black woman in the same situation as well as to numerous other combinations. 
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Denying victims of intersectional discrimination the protection of EU non-discrimination law thus 
clearly results in more women lacking protection than men.  
37 Another example of how EU sex discrimination law can contribute to ensuring equality between 
women and men is the openness for positive action. In so far as paragraph 2 does not alter the 
wording of existing provisions in Treaty and secondary law, paragraph 1 demands a purposive inter-
pretation of its wording reflecting the asymmetric character of sex inequality.  
II. Paragraph 2 
“The principle of equality shall not prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures providing for 
specific advantages in favour of the underrepresented sex.” 
1. Origins 
38 According to the Charter explanations, Article 23 (2) originates from the Treaty provision Article 
157 (4) TFEU). Article 157(4) TFEU reads: “With a view to securing full equality in practice between 
men and women in working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member 
State from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it 
easier for the underrepresented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for 
disadvantages in professional careers.” This provision again has a specific history. It was inserted into 
the Treaty of Amsterdam after a particularly controversial ruling by the Court of Justice on so called 
positive action in favour of women. The Kalanke ruling 79 of 1995 concerned a rule specific to career 
development in German public services.80 The German constitution binds public employers to a spe-
cific equality clause, which demands for the merit principle to guide any decision on employment or 
promotion (Article 33 (2) German Constitution). Accordingly, the person who is best qualified under 
a predefined set of qualifications, as assessed by public examinations or by in-post assessment fol-
lowing strictly formal rules, must always prevail. These rules resulted in male dominance in senior 
positions, which motivated the city of Hamburg to task a former judge at the Constitutional Court 
with drafting potential positive action measures.81 The judge came up with a “tie break rule”: in or-
der to overcome persistent underrepresentation of women, women could be preferred over equally 
qualified male competitors in employment and promotion until there were as many women as men 
in the relevant pay bracket.  
39 Arguably this tie break rule was introduced instead of requiring personnel managers to abstain 
from structural discrimination which was quite usual. For example, in-post assessments traditionally 
tended to converge on the same grade after employees or civil servants had achieved certain senior-
ity. As a consequence, choices for promotion were made on the base of “auxiliary criteria”, mainly 
comprising seniority and number of dependants. Due to strict gender role expectations, the percent-
age of female employees in the public sector who were responsible for more than one dependant 
was very low: they would have one dependent if their husband would earn less than themselves, or 
if they were unmarried mothers. Married male employees would typically have three dependants: a 
wife, if earning only slightly less than the husband and two children. Seniority too tended to favour 
                                                          
79 ECJ C-450/93 Kalanke [1995] ECR I-3051 
80 For more detail on this see Dagmar Schiek, 'Sex Equality Law after Kalanke and Marschall 4 (2) European Law 
Journal, 148 - 168', European Law Journal, 4 (1998), 148-68. 
81 Ernst Benda, Notwendigkeit und Möglichkeit von positiven Massnahmen zugunsten von Frauen im 
Öffentlichen Dienst (Hamburg: City of Hamburg, 1986).  
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males in in male dominated sectors, as women had only been given a chance much more recently. 
The City of Bremen had dared to disable these indirectly discriminatory criteria in favour of a tie 
break rule. Thus, Mr Kalanke, a married father of two children, expected to be promoted before Ms 
Glissman, who was younger and without children and had less seniority (despite having more profes-
sional experience, partly accumulated in the private sector). This was very important to him at the 
time, because any promotion after his 60th birthday would not have given him a final salary pension. 
Understandably, he challenged the decision to promote Ms Glissman who had been assessed as 
equally qualified.  
40 The Court of justice based its ruling on Directive 76/207 (since superseded by Directive 2006/54), 
which established the principle of equal treatment between men and women in employment and 
occupation. It also contained a clause that was meant to allow positive action, Article 2 (4). This 
clause read: “This directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote equal opportunities 
for men and women, in particular by removing existing inequalities which affect women’s opportuni-
ties”. The Court only focused on the unequal treatment on grounds of sex, without considering the 
discriminatory policies which were replaced by the “tie break rule”. It enounced that “a national rule 
that, where men and women who are candidates for the same promotion are equally qualified, 
women are automatically to be given priority in sectors where they are underrepresented involves 
discrimination on grounds of sex. (…) As a derogation from an individual right laid down in the Di-
rective, Article 2 (4) must be interpreted strictly (...) A nation al rule which guarantee women abso-
lute and unconditional priority for appointment or promotion go beyond promoting equal oppor-
tunity and overstep then limits of the exception in Article 2 (4) of the Directive”.82 Thus it was held 
that the city of Bremen should have preferred Kalanke on the basis of having a dependent wife and 
two children, although his professional experience was less extensive. The city decided to reassess 
the qualification of both candidates through an extensive interview, which resulted in Ms Glissman 
being considered as better qualified to fill the post. Had the City relied on independent experts in-
stead of peer review within the same unit from the start, there would have been no case of positive 
action. Possibly, such a policy change would have removed discrimination contravening the principle 
of equal treatment of women and men in the first place. 
41 As it was, the case roused considerable discussion,83 including in political circles. The imminent 
negotiation of the Treaty of Amsterdam was utilised to draft and pass an addition to Article 119 EEC, 
later renumbered to Article 141 EEC, which is now contained in  Article 157 (4) TFEU (text quoted 
above paragraph 38). Article 2 (4) Directive 76/207 remained unchanged for the time being. This led 
to juridical debate on whether Article 141 (4) TEC (now: Article 157 (4) TFEU) allowed more scope for 
positive action measures than the directive.84 
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2. The Court’s subsequent case law  
42 Two subsequent rulings on the German public service somehow softened the rigidity of this very 
first case. In Marschall, the Court decided that a tie break rule could be upheld if it contained a “sav-
ings clause to the effect that women are not to be given priority in promotion if reasons specific to a 
male candidate tilt the balance in his favour”.85 In this case, the Court considered realistically that 
“where male and female candidates are equally qualified, male candidates tend to be promoted in 
preference to female candidates particularly because of prejudices and stereotypes concerning the 
role and capacities of women in working life and the fear, for example, that women will interrupt 
their careers more frequently”.86 It even realised that “the mere fact that female and male candi-
dates are equally qualified does not mean that they have the same chances”,87 and concluded that 
“a national rule in terms of which, subject to a savings clause, female candidates for promotion who 
are equally as qualified as male candidates are to be treated preferentially in sectors where they are 
underrepresent ted may fall within the scope of Article 2 (4) if such a rule may counteract the preju-
dicial effects on female candidates of the attitudes and behaviour described above”,88 before stress-
ing that the restrictions laid down in Kalanke continued to apply.89 The Court did not refer to Article 
141 (4) EC, but only relied on Article 2 (4) Directive 76/207.  
43 The Badeck case, decided in 2000,90 was even more interesting, in that it covered a wide range of 
positive action measures. The legislation at stake contained binding targets for increasing the pro-
portion of women employees in sectors where they had been underrepresented in the past, leaving 
the way to achieve those targets to the employer. The employer, however, remained bound by the 
merit principle quoted above. Accordingly, it could only ever prefer women over men if they were at 
least equally qualified.91 Further, the legislation contained two cases of strict quotas. For fixed term 
positions in universities, which served as a base to obtain a PhD or a Habilitation92, the legislation 
established binding targets. Universities had to employ women as PhD researchers to the same per-
centage which they established among those graduates in the relevant subject who qualified for PhD 
research. For Habilitation, the same principle applied. This binding target was accepted, under the 
assumption that women could only be preferred if equally qualified.93 The Court also sanctioned s 
strict quota for training places, referring to the fact that these were not employment opportunities, 
but rather opportunities to obtain employment, without demanding equal qualification for these 
posts.94 
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44 The Court further limited the scope for positive action again in the Abrahamsson case,95 concern-
ing a Swedish rule under which employment of professors in subjects where they were grossly un-
derrepresented could waive the requirement that the female professor should be equally qualified 
with the male professor. The Court of Justice held that such a rule went beyond the scope allowed 
by Directive 76/2007 and Article 141 (4) EC. However, the Court stressed that there was ample scope 
of changing selection criteria in such a way as to prefer criteria that would benefit women.96 
3. Scope for development under Article 23 (1) and (2) 
45 Positive action is a potential way to achieve substantive equality in favour of women, who suffer 
the brunt of sex discrimination. However, the Court’s case law does not seem conducive to develop-
ing those instruments further. The question to be discussed in the remaining space for this provision 
concerns the prospective development of positive action under the new charter provision.  
46 Initially a few remarks on notions of positive action seem adequate. There is some debate on 
whether positive action includes measures that are not necessarily in breach of formal equality prin-
ciples. A frequently quoted article by McCrudden97 included a number of measures that were in-
tended to overcome inequalities, but did not constitute unequal treatment based on sex, starting 
with eradicating unlawful discrimination. Further layers of positive action included “purposefully in-
clusive policies” and “outreach measures”. Both categories may not go beyond overcoming indirect 
discrimination, e.g. if advertisements for employment and/or training opportunities are placed 
where they will also be seen by women, rather than in places mostly frequented by men. Outreach 
programmes can also include special training and information opportunities for women. Further, re-
defining merit is brought forward as an important element. However, this too falls within the cate-
gory of eradicating unlawful discrimination. If, for example, experiences acquired by managing a 
family are valued in the same way as experiences acquired while managing a sports team, this only 
eliminates unjustified preference for experiences more typically acquired by men than by women 
and the unjustified disregard for experiences more typically acquired by women than by men. Only 
as the last resort, preferential rules are propagated. This categorisation can be useful in a legal envi-
ronment which prohibits real positive action, consisting of temporary advantages as mentioned by 
Article 4 CEDAW. However, it seems exaggerated to characterise lawful behaviour (eliminating dis-
crimination) as positive action. The term “positive action” should be reserved for measures opening 
up additional opportunities for women, and at the same time impacting upon opportunities for men. 
98 
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47 It is not necessary that the opening up of opportunities relates to equally qualified candidates 
though.99 This specific requirement, which seems to permeate the Court’s case law on access and 
promotion quotas, derives from specific obligations of public employers under some national legisla-
tion. However, not all employers are required to choose the best qualified candidate under some ob-
jectively assessed catalogue of criteria. It is much more typical that employers maintain some discre-
tion, which allows them to assemble a range of abilities in their teams. Similarly, schools, universi-
ties, teams for cultural activities or sports clubs should not have to apply predefined merit criteria to 
avoid discrimination claims. As we have seen, the Court of Justice has waived the qualification crite-
rion for training posts in the Badeck case.100 The same case also debated quota rules for collective 
bodies. Although the Court proceeded on the assumption that the relevant paragraph of the dis-
puted legislation was not binding, the short reasoning is still worth mentioning. The Court concedes 
that different measures could apply for bodies that are established by election, thus suggesting that 
merit based on formal qualification is not the only way of deciding about access to positions.101 
48 Developing positive action for a range of fields may not profit from limiting admissible selection 
criteria to formally assessed qualifications. The recent Commission proposal for representation of 
women on company boards102 constitutes a good example for the detriments of the present doc-
trine, which is based on a very limited number of cases concerning public employers. The disputed 
Commission proposal not only sets a quota for non-executive company directors, but also imposes 
upon companies the establishment of qualification criteria. Thus, it excludes the election of non-ex-
ecutive directors by shareholders or workers’ representatives, which constitutes an element of in-
dustrial relations in a number of Member States. The proposal thus seems overly narrow in its per-
ception of equality between women and men. Relying on a limited set of cases which all were based 
in public sector employment, it assumes that pre-defined merit is always the best criterion to fill po-
sitions. Allowing for the opportunity to apply a quota to the lists of candidates from which non-exec-
utive company directors are elected would have been a less intrusive way of adopting positive action 
measures more adequate to the sector’s practices in all Member States.103  
49 More flexibility in relation to positive action measures than allowed by the Court of Justice in its 
four scarcely reasoned rulings on the matter is demanded not only by the principles developed for 
Article 23 (1) CFREU, which must be referred to as guidance when applying Article 23 (2). Further, 
international law obligations relating to temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto 
equality of women and men under the CEDAW (above paragraph 16).104 The CEDAW Committee has 
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repeatedly stressed that state parties may be under an obligation to at least provide adequate expla-
nations for not adopting temporary special measures if they have not achieved any acceleration of 
de-facto equality of women and men.105 This is closely related to the fact that under CEDAW tempo-
rary special measures are not considered as an exception from the principle of equality, but rather 
as a precondition to achieve the aims pursued under this principle. This does not prevent the 
CEDAW Committee from stressing that state parties must take appropriate measures to ensure that 
temporary special measures do not conflict with constitutional equality principles. However, in stark 
contrast to the Court of Justice it prefers a balancing of accelerating de facto equality of women and 
the constitutional demands of equality. This balancing is mainly achieved by the temporary character 
of the special measures and by making every effort to tailor the measures to the specific aims to be 
achieved. For example, this would also require to allow a wider range of positive action measures in 
training than in employment, as acknowledged by the Court of Justice in his Badeck ruling. These 
principles would also demand to develop tailored measures for allowing improvement of women’s 
representation among those elected as non-executive company directors, e.g. by trade unions.  
50 Overall, the restrictive case law of the Court of Justice on positive action, as established in four 
judgements mainly relating to public employment is not adequate for developing tailored positive 
action measures for “all areas”, as demanded by Article 23 (1) CFREU and the international law bases 
of this provision. Article 23 (2) is worded sufficiently open as to be interpreted in line with the first 
paragraph of the same provision as to allow a wider range of positive action  measures than merit-
focused tie break rules for promoting public servants. The new provision should be read in a holistic 
way and taken as a starting point for developing a wider arsenal of temporary special measures to 
achieve de-facto equality of women and men.  
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